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1. Introduction
Many of the regulatory schemes proposed recently reward a firm for increases in output beyond
the level that would be choosen in the absence of government intervention. In this paper, we propose
a apparently unrecognized approach to inducing firms to expand output. Output increases are
induced when firms compete with one another for a reward (output prize). In a wide variety of
circumstances, this scheme induces increases in consumer surplus that exceed the output prize.
Thus, consumers/taxpayers can be net beneficiaries and, as a result, might voluntarily agree to
such a scheme.
In one sense, the regulation problem was solved by Loeb and Magat [1979] when they described
an extremely clever incentive scheme that the government could employ to induce a regulated firm
to produce the efficient output even if the government did not know the firm's costs.1 In their
scheme, the amount that the government pays a firm is set equal to the increase in consumers'
surplus that arises as the firm lowers its price and increases its output. In this way, the gov-
ernment makes the firm's revenue function identical to the revenue function of a perfectly price
discriminating monopolist and so achieves the Pareto efficient level of output.
Loeb and Magat realized that the scheme had the unsavory property that all of the surplus
gains would accrue to the firm. Still, they noted that one could auction the right to be the
monopolist and they asserted that the revenues from the auction would equal the profits earned by
the monopolist. Unfortunately, in many reasonable cases, the auction is unlikely to capture most
of the surplus in the market.
Loeb and Magat's claim will dearly be true when there are at least two identical bidders who
have complete information and no bidding costs. In that case, a second price auction results in
revenues that are exactly equal to the profits that the monopolist will make under the Loeb-Magat
i Other similar attempts incdade Demseta (1968) and Vogelsang and Finsinger [1979].
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incentive scheme. Furthermore, if the bidders do not have complete information but the auction is
a private values auction2 with no bidding costs, the result still follows. In most other situations,
however, either it is not known whether the result follows or the result is known to be false.
The easiest way to illustrate this claim is to consider a complete information auction with
two heterogeneous bidders and costless bidding. In particular, suppose that the bidders' costs
differ. This may be because the firms have different production costs or because one of them is
an incumbent who has already paid certain sunk costs that an entrant would have to repeat. If
bidder one has the lower costs, then bidder one will win the auction and pay the profits that bidder
two would have earned. Since the differential in profits that could be earned might well be large,
this auction may capture only a small portion of the profits that the winning bidder will actually
earn. Further, even if the differential in profits is small, if there is a cost to bidding, there is only a
mixed strategy equilibrium 3 and so revenues from the auction are still less than asserted by Loeb
and Magat.
Things get even murkier when one considers other possibilities. For example, it is clear that
the bidders are all going to face similar (identical) demand and so if part of their private information
concerns demand, there will be aspects of a common value auction too. In pure common values
auctions, English auctions yield the highest revenue because they permit the bidders to infer
something about the information of others from their bidding behavior.4 Unfortunately, little is
known about expected revenues at least in part because the set of equilibrium bidding strategies
is not well understood5 and less is known about expected revenues in mixed auctions.
2 In a private values auction, one bidder's information about the his own value of the object reveals no infor-
mation about the value to the other bidders.
a To see this note that in any pure strategy equilibrium, bidder one must bid arbitrarily more than~ bidder two.
Thus, bidder two must lose the auction with probability one. This means that a better reply would have been
not to bid since bidder two would have avoided the bidding costs. This argument can be formalized to show
that there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
4 For details, see Milgrom and Weber [1982] or McAfee and McMillan [1987].
s One can characterize a symmetric equilibrium but little is known about the existence or properties of asy m-
metric equilibria.
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Since the publication of Loeb and Magat's important article, work in this field has emphasized
the importance of the relative weighting of consumer and producer benefits. Much of this research
has adopted a Principal-Agent framework in which the consumer benefits receive larger weight.
In this framework, it is known that if the government's objective function weights the consumers
and producers evenly, Loeb-Magat is an optimal incentive scheme. Further, if one believed that
the auction scheme could extract all of the profits, then even if one weighted the consumers more
heavily, Loeb-Magat with the auction would be an optimal incentive scheme. Nonetheless, many
authors have suggested different solutions to this incentive design problem.6 The differences arise
for two reasons. First, the authors' decide that the weight on the consumer surplus should be
higher than the weight on producer profits and second, at least implicitly, that the auction cannot
extract all of the producer's profits. Examples include the optimal schemes that are obtained in
Baron and Myerson [1982], Sappington [1983] or Baron and Besanko [1984].7
Thus, there are two reasons for pursuing the analysis in this paper. First, like many other
authors, we believe that the government may want to give greater weight to consumer benefits and
that the Loeb and Magat auction scheme will not extract all of the profits. Hence, there is a reason
for pursuing alternative methods for controlling firms. Second, the Loeb-Magat scheme requires
that the regulator know the market demand curve at least in the region between the monopoly
output level and the efficient output level. Without this knowledge, none of the appealing properties
of their scheme obtain and so, again, alternatives may well do better.8
The alternative that we suggest is to induce competition among firms as a means of inducing
output increases. That is, rather than simply "bribing" them d la a standard incentive scheme that
obtains in the Principal-Agent framework, we consider incentive schemes in which the payment to
6 That many authors find Loeb-Magat with the auction scheme to be unsatisfactory is clear from the fact that
their solutions are not first best, as is Loeb-Magat.
7 An interesting variation is Shleifer [1985] who suggested "yardstick" competition as a method of collecting
and utilizing additional information about the costa and operations of a company.
8 For example, if demand becomes extremely convex at prices just below marginal cost and if the government
uses a linear approximation to demand in the incentive scheme, then the induced output increase may be far
beyond the efficient level.
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one firm can depend on the actions of other firms as well as its own actions. In contrast to Shlcifer
who used other firms as a means of eliciting useful information, we seek to use other firms to create
useful incentives. The firms put additional pressure on one another to produce additional output;
the government induces competition between firms that may or may not have been competitors
prior to the introduction of the scheme.
More precisely, we study mechanisms in which the government puts up a prize that is divided
between the firms in a manner that depends on the output produced by each.9 By making the
portion of the prize that a firm receives depend on both its own output and the output of the other
firms, the government can induce competition for the prize and, as a result, obtain a larger change
in output for any total prize. An important feature is that such a scheme can increase consumer
surplus by more than the total prize. With simulations, we show that this occurs for a wide range
of plausible demand and cost parameters.
We emphasize that the scheme can be implemented by inducing competition between any
two (or more) firms-not just between firms that already compete with one another. This means
that unrelated public utilities can be "joined" or performance in imperfectly competitive multifirm
markets can be enhanced with this scheme. Competition between firms in the product market
complicates the analysis, but we show that under reasonable conditions output prizes will still gen-
erate Pareto improvements. Our scheme does not yield first-best outcomes, it can, with reasonable
demand and cost assumptions, yield large welfare gains and, most distinctively, strict Pareto im-
provements. In fact, it can do so even when the government has very little information. Thus, it
may offer many of the benefits with less institutional (and costly) structure than either yardstick
competition or single-firm, principal-agent incentive schemes.
The intuition behind the effectiveness of output prizes comes from recognizing the wide range
SIn contrast to the prizes and incentives (Nalebnff and Stiglit: [1983)) or tournament (Rosen (1986]) literatures,
payoffs here depend not on the participants' ordinal rankings, but on their actual performance relative to the
performance of the others.
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of Pareto improving payments that could be made to a monopolist as a. reward for expanding
output. Any payment for an additional unit that is greater than the difference between marginal
cost and marginal revenue will induce an increase in output and decrease in price. Any payment less
than the associated gain in consumer surplus will still leave consumers better off. The government,
which is designing an incentive compatible reward system and is interested in maximizing consumer
welfare, would like to make marginal payments to the monopolist as dose as possible to the firm's
lost profits from output expansion (MC - MR). Firm's are unlikely to truthfully reveal the lost
profits, but they will compete for additional revenues so long as the marginal reward - the increased
share of the prize - is greater than the marginal lost profits.
Since we assume that consumers must put up the funds for the output prize, their welfare will
be maximized when the government chooses the prize so that a marginal increase results in an equal
increase in consumer surplus. Though the cost and distortion from collecting the funds for the prize
is not our immediate concern, it is an important issue in any discussion of a regulatory scheme that
involves payments to the firms. There are two approaches to this problem. The first is to assume
that the free rider problem is so severe that the government should do the provision. Adopting
such a view means that collecting the money is costly since lump sum taxation is infeasible. The
second approach is to have the local public good provided privately. There is a growing literature in
this area and a lack of consensus. However, Bagnoli and Lipman [19881 have shown that there is a
natural contribution game that has the property that every refined equilibrium is in the core. This
means that if we were to use this mechanism, then the consumers would voluntarily contribute the
amount of money needed to implement the regulatory scheme. Thus, there would be no deadweight
social cost to raising the funds (aside from whatever transactions costs exist).
The next section presents the model and our analysis as well as the special cases of independen t
demands and homogeneous products. Section 3 provides the simulation results alluded to above.
Our purpose is to show that the scheme works for a wide range of cost and demand parameters
and to provide additional comparative statics results that are the preliminaries to solving for the
optimal scheme of this type. Section 4 contains concluding comments.
2. The Model
Any model of government intervention in the market must specify both the information avail-
able to the government as well as the constraints on its ability to intervene. We model the gov-
ernment as having less information than firms and we assume that the government must choose a
method of intervention that is made known to firms prior to the time that the firms must respond.
That is, the government must "move first" and this move is made without the benefit of full in-
formation. This immediately implies that schemes that rely on the government knowing the full
information, socially optimal allocation are not feasible. Further, the types of schemes that are
possible will depend on the amount of information that the government has.1 0
We assume that the government has no information on production costs and very limited
information on demand. In particular, all that is known is the price and quantity sold prior to
government intervention. As for the firms, in order to simplify the analysis, we assume that when
they make their production decisions, they know their own costs as well as the costs of their rivals,
the demand for their product and the scheme that the government has selected. That is, they
compete in a complete information game. This is where our simplification helps in the analysis.
Since our focus is on how promoting competition through regulation leads to better outcomes, we
must solve the game between the firms that the government has induced. Assuming that the firms
have complete information is strong, but informational asymmetries between the firms is not our
focus and the assumption greatly simplifies the analysis. Relaxing this assumption is possible at
the cost of much more complex notation but is straightforward and yields little additional insight.
10 For example, in their classic paper, Loeb and Magat require that the Eovernment know the relevant portion
of the market demand curve so that the "bribe" of the realized consumer surplus from an output increase can
be made. In the principal-agent style model of regulation, It is generally assumed that the government knows
all but the regulated Airm's costs of production.
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Having informally explained why our model is constructed as it is, let us proceed to a careful
description and an analysis of it. We begin by assuming that there are only two firms that
the government might regulate. None of our results depend on this restriction, but it greatly
simplifies notation. We do not assume that the firms sell the same product or in fact that they sell
competing products. Below, we consider two special cases: first, the two firms are each monopolists
in independent markets, and second the firms sell homogeneous goods under Cournot competition.
We assume that the government chooses from the following class of schemes designed to
promote competition between the firms. The government chooses an amount of money to be split
between the firms, referred to as the prize, and a sharing rule that determines the division of the
prize. Letting S(ql,q2,x) be the amount of money paid to firm 1 under the scheme, we restrict
ourselves to S(qi,9q2, z) = s(qi, q2):. That is, the share of the prize that firm 1 receives depends
on the output it and its rival choose but not on the size of the prize. This linearity of S in z would
be an important restriction if we were searching for the optimal sharing rule, but the limitation
does not hamper our demonstration of the possible effectiveness of these schemes.
We assume that s is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its second. That is, firm
l's share rises if its output rises and firm 2's share, 1 - s(qi,q2), rises if its output rises. We let ir
represent firm 1's profits in its output market as a function of its sales and the sales of firm 2, and
r be firm 2's profits. 11 Thus, under the scheme, firm 1's total payoff is
P1 (q, q2, s,z)= r(q,q2)+ s(qi, q2)z
and firm 2's payoff is
P2(q1,q2, s, z) = *(q,q2) + (1 - s(q,q2)]z.
Since a and z are ander the regulator's control, if we were to make assumptions about the
concavity of the payoff functions, we would be implicitly imposing restrictions on the regulator's set
" The extreme cases of independent demands and homogeneous products are special cases. For independent
demands, firm i's profits do not depend on j's output and in the homogeneous product case, firm i's profits
depend on his own output and on the sum of the outputs.
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of feasible schemes. As we would not be sure of how our results would depend on the restrictions,
we choose to make assumptions about the firms' profit functions only. In particular, we assume
that each firm's profit function is strictly concave in its own output for each output choice of its
rival and we will generally assume that the firm's profits are non-increasing in its rival's output.
That is we will not have the firms selling complementary products.
In order to do the comparative statics, we assume that.s and the firms' profit functions are
twice continuously differentiable. To sign the comparative statics, we will end up assuming that
a firm's payoff responds more to a change in its own output than to a change in its rival's, i.e.,
direct effects outweigh indirect effects.12
These assumptions guarantee that there is a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the
government's choice. Further, if s is strictly concave in q1 and strictly convex in q2, then there is
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It can be characterized as the solution to the appropriate first
order conditions. Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee that there is not a mixed strategy equilibrium
too, nor can we guarantee that every solution to the first order conditions is a Nash equilibrium.
This latter problem arises because we cannot assume that the payoff function is strictly concave
in the firm's choice variable.13
Differentiating the firms' payoff functions gives the following first and second order conditions:
(1) -- (q1,q2, s,x) = Wi + si = 0
891
(2) OP2(g9s,z = 1r - 82Z = 0
12 This assumption will be made explicitly below.
13 We do not choose to but one could restrict the government to a functions that are strictly concave in gi
and strictly convex in q2. Such an assumption guarantees that the firm's payoff function is strictly concave in
its choice variable. In fact, one can not only satisfy this constraint but can simultaneously satisfy symmetry.
That is, there is a class of s functions which are strictly concave in ei, strictly convex in es and satisfy
s(gi,qg2) = 1 - a(92,qi). One might wish to satisfy the latter if one felt that if the firms' output quantities
were reversed, their shares of the prize should be too. The simulations in section 3 use a symmetric sharing
rule.
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and
(3) +
8*P1
(4) = r72 - anz,
where we follow the standard convention that subscripts refer to the appropriate partial derivative,
e.g., Ti j j.
Totally differentiating equations (1) and (2) and rearranging yields
Oqi -1 8 ( 12 )dq 2-- t=[i + (a12 + j1x-,oz -[ x11 + 3h1 z] dz
892 1 - q9
-- = [-32 + (*21 - n q1 )--].
Ox -[{11 - 322z dz
Given that the first order conditions are evaluated at a global maximum, these equations define
how the firms' equilibrium quantities vary with changes in z.
Before substituting, we discuss the intuitive meaning of these equations. Satisfying the second
order conditions means that the first term in both equations is positive. The second term, the term
in brackets, is made up of three pieces. The first is the direct effect on output due to the fact that
the firm is being paid to produce more units. It is positive by our assumptions on s. The second
piece, X12 or ir21, respectively, arises from the possibility that the firms compete with one another
in their output markets. If the firms sell substitutes, one expects that this term is negative. That
is, if firm 1's rival increases output, firm 2's marginal profits fall. If the firms were in completely
independent markets, then this term would be zero.
The third term is the effect due to the government's cheme of fostering competition between
the firms. Since a is twice continuously differentiable, an2 = 821. If both were zero, the marginal
payment to firm i would be independenti of the quantity chosen by firm j and so the third term
9
is the "inducing competition" effect of our scheme. This identification allows one to clearly see
the advantage of inducing competition. If the government had not induced competition, the firm's
behavior could only be modified by "bribing" it directly. That is,'one could have paid the firm
for increases in output by making a depend only on the firm's output not on the output choice
of its rival. Thus, if 3 12 is positive and if the incentive scheme induces the rival to increase its
output, then the incentives to increase output are larger under induced competition by the amount
s12(g1,q2) -
Letting D; stand for the second derivative of firm i's objective function, substitution yields
(5) q = . [311D2 - 32(1 +zsuZ)].(x D1 D2 - (7r12 + X312 )(7r 2 i - xs2)
We seek the sign of this derivative. If it is negative, we know that there is no possibility that the
consumers would be willing to pay for the output prize while if it is positive, they might be willing
if the increase in consumers' surplus exceeded the cost. To sign the derivative, we study each term
separately. If the products are strategic substitutes,14 then the first term D1D2 is positive, but the
second term is too because it is the product of two negative numbers. Thus, without additional
assumptions, the denominator is unsignable.
Note that D1 is how firm 1's marginal payoff changes with changes in 1's output while ,r 2 +xs 12
is how firm 1's marginal payoff changes with changes in firm 2's output. It seems sensible to assume
that the firm's marginal profits respond more to a change in its own output than to a change in
its rival's output. That is the direct effect, I D1  i s, is larger than the indirect effect, Ir12 + xs12
If one makes this assumption for both firms, the first term in equation (5) is positive.
The second term is unsignable except in certain special cases that we discuss below or under
a much stronger assumption. If we continue to assume that the direct effect outweighs the indirect
effect, then the numerator can be shown to be positive if a is symmetric and the firms compete
" See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Kiemperer [1985].
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symmetrically. For s to be symmetric, we require that if we interchange the quantities produced,
the fractions of the prize received are also interchanged."5 By having the firms compete symmet-
rically, we mean that T12(q1, q2, s, z)+ x312(q1,q 2 ) = *r1(l,q93, s,2) - :s21(ql, q2). This is a very
strong assumption, however, so we instead analyze the effects in two special cases - independent
demands faced by separate monopolists and Cournot competition among producers of a homoge-
neous product. In the next section, we use simulations to better understand the possibilities for
(5) to be positive.
Before turning to the special cases, we must still determine whether or not the change in z
induces a larger change in consumer surplus. If it does not, then the consumers would be opposed
to the scheme. This boils down to asking whether the derivative of consumer surplus with respect
to a change in x is larger than 1. If the government does not know the demand curves, then it
must choose a method of approximation and do the computations in that manner. If it knows
the demand curves, then the computations are as follows. Let the demand for each product be
f(qi, q2) = Pi and g(qi, q2) = Pz respectively. Then consumer surplus is the line integral
CS(q1, q2,p1,p2) = 1 f(q,)dq+j g(qi,9)dq - pq1 - p2q2.
Differentiating with respect to z and substituting for pi,
dCS'=[f(gl,0)+g(gl,q2) - g(i,0)- f(qi,q 2) -fqlf'(91,92)J-
+ [g(l,2)- g(ql,q2) - q2g'(q1,2)J
Ox
(6) =[f(ql,0)+ g(ql, q2) -g(q,0) - f(qi,q2) - qdf'(q1,q)] + [-q 2 g'(q1,q2 )J-
Since the products ar a substitutes, when output increases with outpat prizes, consumer surplus
increases. Still, whether the increase is larger than the total prize is not clear. Yet, if (6) is
evaluated at x = 0, it is clear that a one dollar increase in the prize can lead to an increase in
is Formally, this means that s(gi , 2) = I - a(qs, et ).
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consumer surplus that exceeds one dollar. Since the easiest way to see this is In the simulations,
we postpone any further discussion of this point to the next section.
. Three points should be made before moving on. First, if the government does not know market
demand, it can be approximated using data on prior market outcomes by a linear demand curve,
an isoelastic demand curve or some other functional form. Doing so alters the terms the partial
derivatives multiply in (6), but is not difficult to implement. Second, we have made minimal as-
sumptions about the markets that the firms service and have made minimal assumptions concerning
the equilibrium that characterizes their competition. In particular, we should emphasize that we
have not imposed symmetry on the equilibrium. That is, the solution to the first order conditions
(equations (1) and (2)) may well be asymmetric and if so, our analysis still follows. Finally, we
must point out that without strict concavity of the payoff function, care must be exercised in doing
comparative static analysis. For many seemingly reasonable a functions, the firm's payoff function
may have two peaks. In such a situation, the equilibrium output choices are not differentiable
everywhere and so one must also worry about the standard issues of local versus global optima.
2.A. Independent Demands
In this subsection, we assume that the firms' dema.nds are independent and that they were
pure monopolists prior to the inducing of competition with an output prize.
In addition to providing a better understanding of the more general problem, the case of
independent demands is interesting in its own right. The scheme that we have been studying is
designed to provide gains by fostering competition among the firms. The independent demands
case might be thought of as the purest case, because no other interaction between the firms clouds
the analysis. One example of such an application might be electricity companies in different states
or locals. Often they are regulated independently or, if comparisons are made, they are relatively
12
informal. Under our proposal, direct competition would be introduced.1
A second example was a scheme actually considered by the New York Port Authority. In 1984,
they entertained the idea of selling or leasing takeoff and landing "slots" at some of the New York
area airports that the Port Authority controls.1 7 A slot is the right to have a plane take off or
land at a certain time of day. For some reason, the Authority decided that it did not want to make
a net profit on the venture, so it proposed rebating the total revenues from the activity to the
airlines on a passenger-weighted basis. That is, each firm's share of the total prize would be the
same proportion as its share of the total number of passengers carried to or from these airports.
The plan was never implemented and we know of no other case in which such output prizes have
been considered.
To assume that the demands are independent is to assume that firm i's profits (not payoff)
depends only on its own output not on the output of its rival. In this case, all of the cross partial
derivatives of profits are zero. Hence, (5) becomes
(5') -=[a,1D2- -822zs21.)x D1D2 + X312Z321
Again, relying on the direct effect outweighing the indirect effect, the first term is positive. Since s 2
is negative the second term is also positive. Further, in this case, the change in consumer surplus
is easier to calculate because the change in consumer surplus in market 1 is independent of the
output choice in market 2 (except as that choice affects the realized change in qi). That is,
CS = j f(q)dq + j g(q)dq - f(q1)q' -9(q2)q2.
Differentiating yields
dCS , q1 , Oq-2
1t _t t t" 0 t-- t -q L ( - - -a29 ( .L -. - s - - -- - - - L- -- -
is Other local natural monopolie might also be addressed in this way, such as water companies, bus systems,
etc.
1? See Borenstein [1988] for an analysis of the efficiency of such slot markets. Guler, Plott and Vuong (1986]
has a more complete description of the New York Port Authority proposal and Riordan and Sappington [1987J
analyze the general problem of awarding monopoly franchises.
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or, after substituting for the partial derivatives, and evaluating at z = 0,
dCS q, '(qi)-.fL
= - f (12(2)
dz -en -T22
(6') =P131' + P(-3z)
ei(-w 1 1 ) E 2 (- 2 2 )
where E1 is the elasticity of demand in market i. Since s, is a choice variable, it is dear that one
can make (6') greater than 1.
The importance of this special case is now clear. One can induce competition among previously
non-competing firms and generate sufficient increases in output to cause consumer surplus to rise
by more than the "bribe" needed to induce the competition (at least locally). The reason that we
continue to emphasize this comparison is that this means that everyone is strictly better off with
the regulation than without. That is, the firms, being profit maximizers, make at least the level of
profits they made before the regulation18 and the consumers as a group are better off even if they
put up the "bribe." Thus, if there is some way to get the consumers to put up the bribe, this type
of regulation could be accomplished with minimal difficulty.
2.B. Homogeneous Products
The second special case that we consider is that of two firms selling a homogeneous product.
In this case, a firm's profits depends on its own output and on the sum of the outputs. We do not
assume that the firms have the same costs and therefore will not focus on a symmetric equilibrium.
In this case, let the market demand curve be p = f(q1+Q2). Since the firms sell a homogeneous
product, it makes sense to compute the change in total output due to a change in z. That is,
+9q =q 1[- zan)+(r - za1) - 2- + zsu + ("l2 + zon)]
15 They can always choose to make the monopoly quantity and not "compete" for the prize. In (his event, if
they receive any of the prize, they are better off and if they do not, they are no worse off.
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where A = DiD2 - (*21 - za21)(r12 +z312)> 0. Unlike the general case, assuming that the direct
effect outweighs the indirect effect makes the change in total output positive. Note that it is not
possible to ensure that both firms increase output because s12 > 0 ensures that qi rises but 321 < 0
ensures that q2 rises. Thus, one firm's output must increase but the other's might not.
Computing the change in consumer surplus is also easier under the assumption that the firms
sell a homogeneous product. Letting Q be total output,
dCS(Q) , 8Q
= -Qf (Q)-.dx 8z
Since we are assuming that f' <0, i.e., demand curves slope down, we see that consumer surplus
rises. Again, it is possible that the induced change xceeds 1 but not guaranteed. As above, it will
depend on the government's choice of s.
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3. Simulating the Effects of Output Prizes
In this section, we use simulations to further explore the effects of output prizes on consumer
surplus and efficiency. The previous section proved that such induced output competition may
lead to increases in consumer surplus that are greater than the prizes awarded. Here we impose
functional forms and parameter values to investigate net consumer surplus gains that might obtain
in real world markets. The simulations are necessary because dosed-form solutions to the imposed
game do not exist for the functional forms that we investigate. We demonstrate that consumer
surplus gains can exceed the output prize under reasonable demand and cost conditions. In ad-
dition, we generate some "numerical comparative statics" that indicate the situations in which
output prizes are most likely to be effective.
We assume that the rule for firm 1's share of the output prize is1
k
(7) ,(qi,q 2 ) =
91 + q2
which is just division according to shares of total output when k = 1 and becomes winner-take-all
as k -+ oo. Thus, k might usefully be interpreted as an index of the degree of competition between
the two firms eligible for the prize. As k increase, it becomes more important for each firm to
produce a large output relative to the other.
Unfortunately, this function is not concave in q and can therefore lead to local maxima
that are not a firm's global best response. For the constant-elasticity demand curves that we have
examined (elasticities of 1.1 to 5.0), however, a unique profit maximrum is obtained for a wide range
19 It will generally be the case that the rule requires some form of "adding" of the firms' outputs. This is
straightforward if the firms produce a homogeneous product. If they do not, then some arbitrary means of
scaling the products so that they may be "added" is needed. This scaling is arbitrary since it is part of the
sharing rule and need not reflect anything about the consurners' tastes for the two products. For example, if
et is kilowatt hours of electricity and es is pairs of tennis shoes, one arbitrary scaling rule is to assume that
one pair of shoes equals 4 kilowatt hours and convert, using this metric, one outpat into the units of the other.
of k values, including ones that allow us to demonstrate the possibility of Pareto improvements.20
We investigate two polar cases of market competition (as opposed to competition for the
output prize) between the two firms that will divide the output prize: independent demands and
Cournot competition in a single homogeneous-good market. In the former case, the contest affects
each firm only through the marginal incentive to increasing its share of the prize, while in the latter
case, the increased output of the second firm in the contest also lowers the first firm's marginal
revenue from sales. The results presented employ constant elasticity demand functions over a range
of elasticities. Similar results obtain for linear demand functions.
The simulations are designed to mimic the decision process of the government prior to inter-
vening. Thus, the data to which the government has access is assumed to be quite limited. In
particular, the government is assumed to observe only the price and quantity sold by each firm.
The results are then calculated for a range of possible demand elasticities and total prizes. We as-
sume that the marginal cost is constant, though the extension to increasing or decreasing marginal
cost is straightforward and is discussed briefly in section 4.
3.A. Independent Demands
Each firm i faces a demand function
A;
P;
20 We have also investigated the sharing rule
s(ft, t2) = 0.5 + -[ln(kit - g92) - in(At q2 - ft)]
where k1 is set so as to maximize the marginal return to output expansion while maintaining concavity of the
share function over the relevant range of outputs and k2 is set so as to assure that over the relevant range,
neither share is ever negative. The consumer surplus enhancement is greater if negative shares are permitted.
Since the rule is implemented so that It is concave In the firm's own output and the firm's profit function
is concave (by assumption), then the payoff function, the sum of profits and share of the prize, is concave
in own output and a unique profit maximum Is assured. Similar effects were round with this rule, but the
combination of concavity and non-negative shares over the relevant range caused the welfare and consumer
surplus enhancement o be less effective.
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where A; is a scale factor, and each firm has constant marginal cost equal to Bj. Given the q;,
p;, and ci, one can immediately solve for A;. Having determined the demand function, there is
only one Bi that makes the observed point a profit maximum. This is obtained from the usual
first-order condition.
When the output prize is introduced, each firm i then has a first order condition for profit
maximization
I A,* kq; -14
(8) (1 - 1/ei)[A-Ai -B + =) 0
qi 9(' + qj) z
where the subscript j refers to the other firm in the contest. The last term is the marginal incentive
due to the output prize. In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in quantities, the first-order conditions
for each firm are satisfied simultaneously. The simulation program solves for such an equilibrium
iteratively.
We begin by discussing results when the firms serve identical (but still separate) markets.
21
We then analyze asymmetry in the markets served by the two firms. Table 1 presents simulations of
the effects of an output prize under alternative demand conditions in the two independent markets.
In all cases reflected in table 1, the two firms start out charging the same price (10) and selling
the same quantity (5000).
In the cases presented in table 1, a $500 prize is to be divided between two firms according to
the formula in equation (7). Even though the prize is just 1% each firm's total revenues, table 1
demonstrates that the induced competition can prompt output increases of much higher percent-
ages and can increase consumer surplus by much more than the cost of the prize. Furthermore,
since profit changes are second order at the original profit maximum, the gain in consumer surplus
is done at fairly small cost to the producers; profits increase by an amount nearly as great as the
prize.
21 Here, identical means identical under the metric used to "add" the outputs of the lirms in the definition of
our sharing rule.
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Table 1 also indicates that, given the starting prices and quantities, the net consumer surplus
gain seems to decrease monotonically as elasticity increases from slightly greater than 1. Though
the lost profits from output expansion are greater when demand is relatively inelastic, firms facing
such inelastic demand begin from a point of very high markup. The competition for the output
prize invokes larger price cuts in these cases, thus causing larger consumer surplus gains for all
inframarginal buyers. This is consistent with equation (6').
One set of simulations may seem to be a narrow basis for support of these inferences, but it is
straightforward to show that a single set of symmetric parameters is isomorphic to any other set of
symmetric parameters and a wide range of seemingly asymmetric cases, so long as total revenues of
the two firms are still equal. Rescaling of the measures of output and the unit of exchange (while
still maintaining a common unit of exchange for all goods) allows conversion of any such case into
the one presented in table 1.22 In fact, table 1 is a general presentation of all cases in which the
firms have equal revenues before output prizes are introduced and the output prize is 1% of either
firm's revenues. Similarly, all asymmetric cases in which the total revenues of two firms are in
some given ratio and the output prize is a fixed proportion of each are isomorphic.
Of course, changing the elasticity is a real alteration and cannot covered by simple rescaling.
In addition, constant-elasticity demand functions are also not completely general for large output
prizes. Still, for small prizes (as a proportion of total firm revenues), some constant elasticity is a
good approximation to the demand function, and the range of elasticities simulated are generally
thought to be the normal range observed in markets where market power is present.
The effect of changes in the size of the output prize relative to the total revenues also cannot
22 Consider the general case of pi q1 = p2q2. If qt # 5000, then redefining the units in which good 1 is measured
will change qr by at the scale parameter (where a = 5000/qj), and change p2 by 1/ai. A similar scale
parameter as can be applied to firm 2 if q2 #& 5000. This wili leave q1 = 92= 5000 and P1 = p2, but not
necessarily equal to 10. Next rescale the unit of exchange by 10/Pt , noting that this also rescales the prize.
Finally, alter the sharing rule so that the quantities used to establish shares are the rescaled quantities, i.e.,
replace i with at qi and 92 with a22 The result is Pt = P2 = 10, q 92 = =5000, and the total prize is in
the same ratio to total revenue of each firm as it was before the rescaling.
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be surmised from a single set of prices, quantities, and a prize value. Table 2 presents the marginal
output, consumer surplus, and profit changes that obtain from changes in the prize at different
ratios of the prize to the total firm revenues. It shows, not surprisingly, that the impact of additions
to the prize cause additional consumer and total surplus gains,23 but at a decreasing rate. This is
to be expected since the marginal lost profit from output increases gets larger as each firm expands
output from its profit maximizing quantity. The result can be interpreted in two ways. First, for a
given size of markets (as measured by total revenues), larger prizes will yield decreasing marginal
gains in consumer surplus. Second, for a, given size prize, the surplus gain will be greatest when it
is applied to larger markets.
When the two firms do not occupy symmetric positions before the output competition is
imposed, the results of the game may be more or less favorable than under symmetry. One form of
asymmetry that may exist is differences in the firms' total revenues before government intervention.
Table 3 shows that for a fixed sharing rule of the type presented in (7), increases in inequality of the
firm sizes, holding constant their joint total revenues and the total output prize, leads to smaller
total gains in consumer surplus. With the sharing rule used here, each firm's marginal incentive
to expand output is greater if the outputs of the two firms are more nearly equal than if they
are quite different. A similar result obtains for another type of asymmetry: asymmetric demand
elasticities, but equal total revenues before intervention. These results, however, are attributable
to the sharing rule employed; the opposite results have obtained with other reasonable sharing
rules.2 4 We have not attempted to determine the optimal sharing rules, but it seems likely that
asymmetric sizes or price elasticities are likely to be more effectively addressed with asymmetric
sharing rules.
These simulation results demonstrate clearly that output prizes can generate net welfare im-
2" This is true over the range presented and is true globally in output and consumer surplus, but total surplus
falls with increases in the prize once prices have dropped below marginal costs.
24 In particular, the sh aring rule discussed in footnote 20 above shows an increased efficacy when the firms are
asymrnetric.
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provements for consumers, but they do not by themselves indicate the importance of the compe-
tition in obtaining the results. We carry out two comparisons to indicate the role of competition.
Table 4 shows the improvements in output enhancement that occur when k is increased in the
sharing rule of equation (7). A given prize generates a monotonic increase in output and net
consumer surplus as k moves towards, but is still quite distinct from, a winner-take-all division.2s
The last line of Table 4 presents the results of a linear subsidy that does not depend on the
other firm's output and that spends the same total amount of money as the output prize. Though
the subsidy was adjusted so as to find the level that would spend a given sum of money, the
marginal profit conditions for each firm at the equilibrium shown are calculated on the assumption
that each firm believes that the subsidy would be paid on any number of units it were to produce.
Interestingly, the linear subsidy does better than the competitive rule when k < 2 and exactly as
well as the rule when k = 2. This result holds for symmetric cases in which the subsidies to both
firms are the same.
The intuition for this result is dear; at the symmetric equilibrium with the competitive rule
and k = 2, each firm's marginal incentive due to the prize is equal to it's average share of the
prize per unit on inframarginal units. That is, the last term on the left-hand side of equation (8)
is equal to z/2qi, which is just the linear subsidy rate - and thus the marginal incentive due to a
linear subsidy - that would spend a total amount of x while subsidizing q; units from each firm.
In general, at a symmetric equilibrium, the marginal incentive due to the sharing rule in (7), the
last term on the left-hand side of (8), is :k/4q. Thus, so long as a symmetric equilibrium exists,
the competitive rule with k > 2 will yield better results than the linear subsidy.
It is clear from the previous paragraph that the arbitrary choice of rewarding all output above
zero does not drive the comparison of the competitive rule and the linear subsidy. Regardless
of where the base quantities are set - the differences from which would determine the output
25 Increases in k much beyond those shown in table 4 caused a symmetric equilbrium to fail to exist.
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shares under the competitive rule or would be used to calculate total compensation with a linear
subsidy - the competitive rule will be more effective so long as k > 2 and a symmetric equilibrium
continues to exist. Both approaches will be more effective if the base quantities are closer to the
pre-intervention outputs. The disadvantage, however, of rewarding only changes from the pre-
intervention output (or, more generally, of making base quantities a function of pre-intervention
output) is that firm's may then reduce output ex ante in anticipation of such schemes.
Table 4 may also be used to compare the effect of competition for output prizes with a modified
version of the Loeb-Magat scheme - one in which the total payment that the government will make
to the firms is restricted to be no greater than a given amount. As was pointed out in footnote
8, if the government were to reward firms under Loeb-Magat by approximating the increase in
consumer surplus with a linear demand function, the result could be severe "overshooting;" if the
demand function were highly convex, the resulting output could greatly exceed the optimum. A
limit on the total payout would then be reasonable.
When k = 4 in table 4, the $500 output prize yields a gross increase in consumer surplus of
$1961.52, and a net increase of $1461.52. If a payout limit of $1961.52 were set under the Loeb-
Magat scheme and if the ex ante auction allowed full recovery of firms' marginal profits due to
their scheme, then consumer surplus would increase by the full $1961.52. If the auction allowed
the government to recover only two-thirds of the change in the firms' profits, however, the firms
would be left with about $654 and consumer surplus would increase by only about $1308. In fact,
this competitive scheme with k = 4 would benefit consumers more than a Loeb-Magat scheme of
equal total payout so long as the recovery rate from the prior auction is less than 74.5%.
Of course, if the government knew the demand function with some precision, it could use that
information under the Loeb-Magat scheme and would have less need to limit the total payout. The
same information would not be as useful with competition for output prizes. Still, if the demand
function were not well known (or could be discovered only at considerable regulatory expense), or
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if the recovery rate from the auction were quite low, then competition for output prizes could yield
a higher expected net benefit to consumers than the Loeb-Magat scheme.
3.B. Homogeneous Products
When the firms that compete for shares of an output prize are also. direct competitors in
the product market, the prize can again have very beneficial results. There is however, a natural
limiting process that occurs in which one firm's response to the prize raises the cost to the other firm
of also expanding output, because quantity increases by one firm lower both company's marginal
revenues. Furthermore, given the price and quantity observations for the two firms and the demand
elasticities in the markets in which they operate, the net surplus to be gained by output expansion
will be greater if each is a monopolist than if the two are already in a Cournot equilibrium. Thus,
both the consumer surplus and total surplus gains from output prizes tend to be smaller when they
are used among Cournot competitors than when they are offered to independent monopolists.28
Table 5 presents the results from a single set of symmetric price/quantity parameters which, as
in the previous section, are isomorphic to any set of symmetric parameters.2 7 As in the independent
case, the prize can induce output expansion and gains in consumer surplus that are much greater
than the total value of the prize. Also as before, the consumer surplus increase is greater when
demand is relatively inelastic.
The most noteworthy difference is that these Cournot competitors can be made worse off by
26 To see this, compare the case in table 5 in which the market demand elasticity is 1.5 and the resulting net
consumer surplus gain from a $500 prize is $983 with the table 1 case in which each firm faces a demand
elasticity of 1.5 and the same size prize yields a net consumer surplus increase of $2435. Of course, this is
largely a result of the different marginal costs implied by the same elasticities at the equilibrium point under
monopoly or Cournot competition. When the marginal costs are equalized, by assuming that each of the
monopolists faces demand elasticities of 3 - which is the local elasticity that each of the Cournot competitors
believes that it faces when the market elasticity is 1.5 and outputs are symmetric - the consumer surplus gain
is actually larger in the Cournot market than in the case of independent monopolists.
27 In this case, the translation is trivial since price must be the same and the unit in which the product is
measured Is common to the two firms.
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the offer of such a prize. Particularly when demand is relatively inelastic, the offer of a prize can
lower the equilibrium profits of both firms. Unlike the independent demands case, firms in this
situation do not have the option of staying with their pre-prize output and remaining at least as
well off as before. The response of the other firm in the contest will lower the profits from any
given level of production. Thus, even at its best response, a firm may earn smaller profits than
before the government "giveaway."
The effect of asymmetry, shown in table 7, is similar to the results discussed for independent
demands. Greater asymmetry yields smaller consumer surplus gains.28 Table 8 corresponds to
table 4 for the case of independent demands and again demonstrates the effect of competition
between the firms for the prize. The case of k = 2 is again equivalent in impact to a linear subsidy
that has the same total outlay and again these do not benefit consumers nearly as much as rules
that employ higher k values, those that migh be characterized as more competitive. In addition,
table 8 demonstrates that with less competitive sharing rules (e.g., k = 2), the output prize might
improve the welfare of both producers and consumers in a homogeneous good market with Cournot
competition.
28 The same caveat as in the last sentence of footnote 25 also appli. here as the opposite result obtained with
the sharing rule in footnote 20.
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4. Conclusions
A wide variety of regulatory schemes that have been proposed reward the firm for increases
in output beyond what would be produced in the absence of government intervention. Depending
upon the information assumptions and their realism, these schemes may or may not be feasibly
implemented. This paper has provided an alternative scheme based on the idea that one means
of giving a firm the incentive to increase output is to make it compete with other firms for an
output prize. Forcing the firm to compete with others for the prize may allow one to give the firm
incentives at a lower cost. An additional benefit of this scheme is that it requires the government
to know very little about the environment. The disadvantage is that we can only ensure that the
scheme can result in increases in consumer surplus that exceed the output prize but, in general,
we cannot achieve the first best outcome.
The other benefit is that the government need not recover profits from the regulated firm
to increase consumer surplus. In some of the proposed schemes (such as Loeb and Magat's) the
government must recover some of the regulated firm's profits through some type of auction. Since
full or substantial recovery of the firm's profits may be difficult in some environments, our proposed
approach to intervention may be preferred in some cases.29
For reasonable demand and cost parameters, competition for output prizes could result in large
total surplus increases and large net consumer surplus increases. In fact, we presented reasonable
cases in which the scheme resulted in strict Pareto improvements. In these cases, implementation
seems most feasible politically. For the particular rule used in the simulations, forcing otherwise
non-competing firms to compete for the output prize and applying the scheme to larger markets
with smaller elasticities resulted in larger gains in net consumer surplus. This information can be
useful in two ways. First, if one wished to apply the sharing rule studied, this information tells you
29 Recall that it is also true that if the government does not know the relevant portion of the demand curve, the
attractive properties of the Loeb-Magat scheme are lost.
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how to get the biggest bang for your buck. Second, the information is a first step in the analysis
of optimal schemes that employ our idea.
We view our work as a first step in the process of including induced competition into the set of
approaches to government intervention. Two important extensions must be made to complete the
analysis of this idea. The first is to study the optimal regulatory mechanism when one is allowed
to induce competition between firms. This is a difficult problem but we believe that it is worth
pursuing.
Second, the possibility of a dynamic implementation scheme that builds on our idea may be
an interesting extension. The reason is that the dynamic structure may give the participating
firms additional incentives to expand output and there may be schemes that achieve the first
best outcome with these additional incentives. We have considered a couple of possibilities. The
basic idea is that the government commits to increase the output prize in the next period if the
(approximated) increase in consumer surplus in the current period exceeds the increase in the prize
from the previous period to the current one. Such a scheme results in added incentives to increase
output as the firms seek to induce the government to increase the output prize. Unfortunately,
we have thus far been unable to construct a stopping rule that limits this increase in incentives so
that the firms do not exceed the efficient output choices.
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TABLE 1
INDEPENDENT DEMANDS
IMPLIED
DEMAND MARGINAL
ELASTICITY COST
(each mkt)
1.5 3.33
2.0 5.00
2.5 6.00
3.0 6.67
EQU IL I B.
PRICE
(each mkt)
9.713
9.808
9.840
9.856
EQUI LIB.
QUANTITY
(each mkt)
5223.37
5198.08
5205.84
5221.78
NET CHANGE
IN CONSUMER
SURPLUS
(both mkts)
2435.07
1461.52
1133.41
967.84
CHANGE IN
PROFITS
(both firms)
478.36
480.76
480.04
478.56
Results of a $500 Output Prize when each firm sets p = 10, q = 5000
before the prize is introduced (K = 4).
TABLE 2
INDEPENDENT DEMANDS
MARGINAL NET MARGINAL
TOTAL NET INCREASE IN INCREASE IN INCREASE IN C.S. PROFIT INCREASE
PRIZE CONSUMER SURPLUS PRODUCER PROFITS W/$1 PRIZE INCREASE W/$1 PRIZE INC.
(both markets) (both markets) (both markets) (both markets)
0. 0. 0. 2.9998 0.99992
100. 298.41 99.21 2.9682 0.98410
500. 1461.52 480.76 2.8489 0.92442
1000. 2851.65 925.82 2.7138 0.85688
5000. 12082.04 3541.02 1.9814 0.49068
10000. 20622.58 5311.29 1.4807 0.24032
Results of an Output Prize when each market demand elasticity is 2 and
each firm has p = 10, q = 5000 before the prize is introduced
(K = 4).
TABLE 3
INDEPENDENT DEMANDS -- ASYMMETRIC FIRM SIZES
QUANTITY IMPLIED
BEFORE MARGINAL EQUILIB.
PRIZES COST PRICE
5000. 5.00 9.8076
5000. 5.00 9.8076
4000. 5.00 9.8627
6000. 5.00 9.9077
3000. 5.00 9.9575
7000. 5.00 9.9817
2000. 5.00 9.9922
8000. 5.00 9.9981
Results of a $500 Output Prize
is 2 and each firm sets p - 10
GROSS CHANGE
EQUILIB. IN CONSUMER CHANGE IN
QUANTITY SURPLUS PROFITS
5198.08 980.76 240.38
5198.08 980.76 240.38
4112.11 556.70 81.13
6112.37 559.23 412.39
3025.66 128.04 16.35
7025.69 128.36 483.25
2003.11 15.56 1.95
8003.11 15.57 498.04
when each market demand elasticity
before the prize in introduced (K = 4).
TABLE 4
INDEPENDENT DEMANDS
K-VALUE
IN SHARING
RULE
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
IMPLIED
MARGINAL
COST
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
EQUILIB.
PRICE
(each mkt)
9.950
9.902
9.854
9.808
9.762
9.717
EQUILIB.,
QUANTITY
(each mkt)
5049.88
5099.51
5148.91
5198.08
5247.02
5295.75
NET CHANGE
IN CONSUMER
SURPLUS
(both mkts)
-2.48
490.20
978.15
1461.52
1940.44
2415.03
CHANGE IN
PROFIT
(both firms)
498.76
495.10
489.07
480.76
470.22
457.51
LINEAR SUBSILY THAT SPENDS $500
5.00 9.902 5099.51 490.20 495.10
Except for linear subsidy case, these are results of a $500
Output Prize when demand elasticity in each market is 2 and
each firm sets p - 10, q = 5000 before the prize is introduced.
TABLE 5
HOMOGENEOUS GOODS, COURNOT COMPETITION
IMPL.I ED NET CHANGE
DEMAND MARGINAL EQUILIB. EQUIIB. IN CONSUMER CHANGE IN
ELASTICITY COST PRICE QUANTITY SURPLUS PROFITS
(each firm) . (both firms)
1.5 6.67 9.853 5112.09 983.45 -252.76
2.0 7.50 9.870 5132.47 816.01 -170.99
2.5 8.00 9.879 5154.83 731.09 -130.67
3.0 8.33 9.884 5177.92 679.22 -106.92
Results of a $500 Output Prize when market price is 10 and each
firm sets q = 5000 before the prize is introduced (K = 4).
TABLE 6
HOMOGENEOUS GOODS, COURNOT COMPET IT ION
MARGINAL NET MARGINAL
TOTAL NET INCREASE IN CHANGE IN INCREASE IN C.S. PROFIT CHANGE
PRIZE CONSUMER SURPLUS PRODUCER PROFITS W/$1 PRIZE INCREASE W/$1 PRIZE INC.
(both firms) (both firms)
0. 0. 0. 1.6666 -0.33336
100. 165.96 -33.51 1.6525 -0.33688
500. 816.01 -171.00 1.5982 -0.35044
1000. 1599.11 -350.22 1.5348 -0.36628
5000. 6913.92 -2021.52 1.1535 -0.46162
10000. 11879.53 -4530.12 0.8549 -0.53626
Results of an Output Prize when market demand elasticity is 2, p = 10,
and each firm sets q = 5000 before the prize is introduced (K = 4).
TABLE 7
HOMOGENEOUS GOODS, COURNOT COMPETITION -- ASYMMETRIC FIRM SIZES
QUANTITY IMPLIED GROSS CHANGE
BEFORE MARGINAL EQUILIB. EQUILIB. IN CONSUMER CHANGE IN
PRIZES COST PRICE QUANTITY SURPLUS PROFITS
5000. 7.50 9.8701 '5132.47 1316.01 -85.50
5000. 7.50 5132.47 -85.50
4000. 8.00 9.9235 4077.25 771.23 -73.33
6000. 7.00 6077.59 183.43
3000. 8.50 9.9798 3020.26 202.61 -14.18
7000. 6.50 7020.31 412.56
2000. 9.00 9.9968 2003.24 32.42 -1.30
8000. 6.00 8003.24 485.08
Results of a $500 Output Prize when market demand elasticity
is 2 and p - 10 before the prize in introduced (K = 4).
TABLE 8
HOMOGENEOUS GOODS, COURNOT COMPET IT ION
K-VALUE IMPLIED
IN SHARING MARGINAL
RULE COST
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.50
7.50
7.50
7.50
7.50
7.50
EQUILIB.
PRICE
9.967
9.934
9.902
9.870
9.839
9.808
EQUILIB.
QUANTITY
(each firm)
5033.88
5066.44
5099.51
5132.47
5165.32
5198.08
NET CHANGE
IN CONSUMER
SURPLUS
-168.77
162.28
490.20
816.01
1139.78
1461.52
CHANGE IN
PROFIT
(both firms)
333.06
165.57
-2.45
-171.00
-340.06
-509.62
LINEAR SUBSIDY
7.50
THAT SPENDS $500
9.934 5066.44 162.28 165.57
Except for linear subsidy case, these are results of a $500
Output Prize when market demand elasticity is 2 and each'firm
sets p = 10, q = 5000 before the prize is introduced.
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